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EVENTFUL DEMOCRATIZATION:  
WHY WE NEED METHODOLOGICAL PLURALISM1 
 
DONATELLA DELLA PORTA 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: A keynote for the SCOPE 2014: Science of Politics – International 
Interdisciplinary Conference of Political Research that took place at the University of Bucharest, 
Faculty of Political Science between 27 and 29 June 2014, this article assesses at theoretical and 
methodological level the way in which both agency and structure are relevant in social 
movements, particularly in processes of eventful democratization. Eventful democratization 
appears as sudden and unexpected, not only to observers or dictators, but also often to the very 
activists who mobilize against the authoritarian regimes. This difficulty in prediction is linked to 
agency and contingency: intense protest events are indeed under-determined moments as 
structural constraints are, if not overcome, at least weakened by the very capacity of mobilization 
to quickly transform relations. Following the social movement literature, the article focuses 
particularly on causal mechanisms at collective level, identifying and discussing relational, 
cognitive, and emotional mechanisms. 
Keywords: social movements, eventful democratization, agency, structure, causal 
mechanisms, collective action. 
 
 
Eventful Democratization: The Methodological Challenges 
 
When moving from structuralist approaches to recognition of the role of 
agency, analysis of democratization processes have often assumed a strategic 
action by the various actors involved in the process. A similar approach has also 
dominated social movement studies, which tended to present social movement 
as “normal politics”. Assumptions of rational action are reflected in the 
methodological choices in research on the topic. 
While also in transition collective action do attempt at strategizing, 
eventful democratization presents, however, special characteristics that make 
traditional methodological approaches insufficient. First of all, conditions 
evolve very quickly in time, making it difficult to single out causes and 
consequences in fast developing processes. Protest events are in fact 
‘contentious and potentially subversive practices that challenge normalized 
                                                          
1
  In the keynote speech I report part of the arguments from my Democratization from 
Below: Comparing 1989 and 2011, Oxford University Press, 2014. 
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practices, modes of causation, or systems of authority’ (Beissinger 2002, 14). 
Protest events might indeed change structures, as they are, in Hannah Arendt’s 
words, ‘occurrences that interrupt routine processes and routine procedures’ 
(1970, 7). Second, motivations develop in action, rather than being exogenous 
to the situation. Third, information are difficult to collect on the spot and, given 
the novelty of the situation, expectations about actors’ behaviors are difficult to 
predict. In fact, transitions from authoritarian rule are illustrations of 
‘underdetermined social change, of large-scale transformations which occur 
when there are insufficient structural or behavioral parameters to guide and 
predict the outcome’ (O’Donnell and Schmitter1986, 363).  
Breaking with essentialist, deterministic, and structuralist understandings, 
one should therefore follow Beissinger’s (2002) stress on temporality, 
contextualization, and agency.  Agency is therefore to be considered as inherent 
in the development of structure, and structure as influencing action, at least to a 
certain extent. As Beissinger observed in his illuminating analysis of the 
breakdown of the Soviet empire, ‘nationalism needs to be understood not only 
as a cause of action, but also as the product of action. This recursive quality of 
human action—the fact that action can function as both cause and effect—and 
the significance of this for the study of nationalism are the central theoretical 
issues’ (Beissinger 2002, 11). A causal analysis, artificially distinguishing 
dependent and independent variables, risks obscuring this continuous 
relationship. In Beissinger’s words, ‘the idea that identities could be defined in 
the context of agency or that nationalism is both a structured and a structuring 
phenomenon has not received sufficient attention’ (2002, 9). 
In parallel, when looking at social movements more in general, we should 
understand them as both structured and structuring phenomena. They are, that 
is, both constrained in their action by the context in which they move, but also 
able, through their action, to change relations among and between actors. As 
Sewell (1990) has shown in his brilliant analysis of the Bastille takeover, this 
does not happen only in the long term, but also in the (very) short, événementiel 
one, as events are relational processes in which various actors make choices that 
are, at least in part, linked to others’ expected reactions. 
It is therefore important to focus attention on the effects of protest on the 
social movement itself, by focusing on what, inspired by the historical 
sociologist William H. Sewell (1996), I have called ‘eventful protest’ (della 
Porta 2008). Sewell defines events as a ‘relatively rare subclass of happenings 
that significantly transform structure’, and an eventful conception of 
temporality as ‘one that takes into account the transformation of structures by 
events’ (Sewell 1996, emphasis added). I suggest that, especially during cycles 
of protest, some contingent intense events tend to affect the given context by 
fuelling mechanisms of social change: organizational networks develop; frames 
are bridged; personal links foster reciprocal trust. In this sense, some protest 
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events constitute processes during which collective experiences develop through 
the interactions of different individual and collective actors, taking part with 
different roles and aims. The event has a transformative effect as it alters the 
conditions for action ‘largely by constituting and empowering new groups of 
actors or by re-empowering existing groups in new ways’ (Sewell 1996, 271). 
Predictability and structural determinacy are indeed challenged as these protest 
events set in motion social processes that ‘are inherently contingent, 
discontinuous and open ended’ (Sewell 1996, 272). 
This bridging of structure and action can be observed through a focus on 
protest events during episodes of democratization. While the social science 
literature on first democratization paid attention to long-lasting processes of 
increase (and sometimes, decrease) in democratic rights, literature on 
transitology has looked at relatively short moments. Rather than analyzing the 
long-term effects of these moments as foundational (or not) for democracy, I 
suggest the importance of reconstructing protests during episodes of 
democratization, their origins, characteristics, and short-term effects. Besides 
causes, attention needs to be focused on the relational, affective, and cognitive 
mechanisms that take place within protest events themselves. The search for 
invariant determinants has to be accompanied by the identification of causal 
mechanisms, that I define as categories of action that filter structural conditions 
and produce effects (see della Porta 2013). Following Tilly (2001), I 
conceptualize mechanisms as relatively abstract patterns of action that can 
travel from one episode to the next, explaining how a cause creates a 
consequence in a given context. I would not restrict capacity of action to 
individuals, however, instead including collective actors. I will in fact consider 
mechanisms as a concatenation of generative events linking macro causes (such 
as contextual transformation) to aggregated effects (for example, cycles of 
protest) through individual and/or organizational agents. In this way, I believe that 
the search for mechanisms helps in combining attention to structure and to agency. 
Looking at mechanisms, my approach is relational, as it locates eventful 
democratization in the interactions of various institutional and non-institutional 
actors; constructivist, as it takes into account not only the external opportunities 
and constraints, but also the social construction of their experiential reality by 
the various actors participating in social and political conflicts; and emergent, as 
it recognizes that democratization from below involves the capacity of events to 
change structures (della Porta 2013). Cognitive and affective processes 
intervene in the mobilization, contributing to define the situation as well as 
forging solidarities and identities.  
First, I suggest looking at democratization events as transformative, 
insofar as they alter the cultural meanings or signification of political and social 
categories and fundamentally shape people’s collective loyalties and actions 
(Sewell 1990). They are settings in which one sees better the structural 
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influences, but also ‘the spectacle-like quality of the event makes it an 
important site of cultural transactions at which national identities are potentially 
formed’ (Beissinger 2007, 22). The contention intrinsic to the event is strongly 
constitutive of identities (Beissinger 2007, 23). As Jeffrey Alexander noted, 
‘Social dramas, unlike theatrical ones, are open-ended and contingent. They can 
be staged, but nobody is certain whether the actors will arrive, who they will be, 
how events will unfold, which side will win a confrontation, and what the 
drama’s effects on the audience will be’ (2011, 36). 
 
 
Eventful Democratization as Theoretical Challenge  
 
Protest campaigns linked to episodes of democratization often appear as 
sudden and unexpected. Tocqueville’s statement about the French revolution 
applies well to democratization from below: ‘never was any such event, 
stemming from factors so far back in the past, so inevitable yet so completely 
unforeseen’ (1955, 1). Surprise clearly applied to 1989. As Giuseppe Di Palma 
noted that ‘before the demise of communism made the front pages around the 
world, few if any of the revisionist students of communism were betting on it’ 
(1991, 52). Not only were Western scholars stunned, but the sudden change 
surprised East European dissidents as well: for instance, as late as the end of 
1988, Czech dissident Vaclav Havel had expected the opposition to remain ‘for 
the time being merely the seed of something that will bear fruit in the dim and 
distant future’. According to an opinion poll conducted a few months after the 
transition, only five per cent answered affirmatively to the question ‘A year ago 
did you expect such a peaceful revolution?’ (cit. in Kuran 1991, 10–11). 
Surprise was also widely mentioned with regard to the Arab Spring, as ‘the vast 
majority of academic specialists on the Arab world were as surprised as 
everyone else by the upheavals that toppled two Arab leaders last winter and 
now threaten several others’ (Gause III 2011, 81). In the public opinion, as well, 
incredulity for the rebellion followed on expectations of immobility. As the 
Egyptian one, also ‘The Tunisian revolution has clearly constituted a real 
political surprise inside as well as outside the country. No specialist, observer or 
politician, Tunisian or non Tunisian, really predicted this revolution, either for 
Tunisia or for any other country of the region’ (Ayeb 2011, 467). 
Paradoxically, however, surprise at extraordinary events is often 
accompanied by interpretations that stress their unavoidability. As Kuran noted, 
‘While the collapse of the post-World War II political order of Eastern Europe 
stunned the world, in retrospect it appears as the inevitable consequence of a 
multitude of factors. In each of the six countries the leadership was generally 
despised, lofty economic promises remained unfulfilled, and freedoms taken for 
granted elsewhere existed only on paper’. The question to address is therefore, 
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‘if the revolution was indeed inevitable, why was it not foreseen? Why did 
people overlook signs that are clearly visible after the fact?’ (Kuran 1991, 12–
13). In order to explain this paradox, Kuran cites the individual’s tendency to 
select information consistent with a dominant interpretative model, so that what 
does not fit the dominant view is temporarily removed when the regimes are 
still stable, and then acquires visibility when regimes fail. Besides this cognitive 
trap, however, there is also the inherently undetermined nature of these 
processes, which are indeed unpredictable as they develop in action. 
What is important, then, is that events suddenly start to fuel themselves, 
as action produces action. Protest events tend to cluster in time, as ‘events and 
the contention over identity which they represent are not distributed randomly 
over time and space. Their appearance is structured both temporally and 
spatially’ (Beissinger 2002, 16). In fact, protests come in chains, series, waves, 
cycles, and tides, ‘forming a punctuated history of heightened challenges and 
relative stability’ (Beissinger 2002, 16). 
Explanations for this clustering have been offered at the micro, individual 
level, looking in particular, within game theoretical perspectives, at the 
demonstrative effects of protest. As Kitschelt summarized, ‘In game-theoretic 
language, people begin to redefine the payoff matrix of participation in 
collective action from that of a prisoner’s dilemma in which individual 
participation is costly and counter-productive to that of a coordination or even 
an assurance game in which individuals’ incentives to contribute and collective 
benefits reinforce each other in a virtuous circle’ (Kitschelt 1993, 416). 
Within this type of approach, Kuran (1991) has interestingly suggested 
that—as ‘mass discontent does not necessarily generate a popular uprising 
against the political status quo’—in order to explain conditions ‘under which 
individuals will display antagonism toward the regime under which they live’, 
one must consider the distinction between public and private preferences. In 
Kuran’s account, each individual has personal views on the government that do 
not necessarily overlap with his or her position in public. While private 
preferences are considered as fixed, the decision to express them in public is 
influenced by a calculation of the risks involved in that choice (1991, 17). So, 
when the dissidents in Eastern Europe were few, they enjoyed private but not 
public support, as people who shared their preferences did not want to risk 
expressing them and even resented the courage of the dissidents. As Havel 
noted, open defiance was then considered ‘as an abnormality, as arrogance, as 
an attack on themselves, as a form of dropping out of society’ (cit. in Kuran 
1991, 30).  According to this approach, protest is expected to spread when 
particular conditions make less risky the public expression of oppositional 
preferences that have been held in private. The payoff for publically expressing 
dissent increases with the size of the dissenting masses, which reduces the cost 
of expressing the private preferences as others do so. Not only repression is 
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more difficult the more are the people who withdraw their support for the 
system, but the intrinsic benefits of participation increase with the social circle 
of recognition that would approve it. Thus, a sort of revolutionary bandwagon 
derives from the contemporary fall in thresholds and rise in public opposition. 
As public opposition increases, it becomes easier to convince those with private 
preferences against the government to mobilize, but also to change the 
preference of others. 
Going beyond the individual level, the analysis of eventful 
democratization I want to articulate in this chapter points at the power of action 
itself in creating and recreating environmental opportunities and organizational 
resources that influence the strategic interactions of various actors. If events fuel 
each other, it is because they are linked ‘in the narrative of the struggles that 
accompany them, in the altered expectations that they generate about 
subsequent possibilities to contest; in the changes that they evoke in the 
behaviour of those forces that uphold a given order, and in the transformed 
landscape of meaning that events at times fashion’ (Beissinger 2002, 17). If 
structural conditions are not (or do not seem) ripe, they might still mature 
during protest campaigns. That is, protest campaigns are eventful, as they 
produce new relations and resources that favour mobilization, rather than being 
a simple product of external and internal conditions. 
In this analysis, I stress the emergent nature of protest. Notwithstanding the 
relevance of protest events for social movements, they have been mainly studied as 
aggregated collective action (for example, in protest cycles). In social movement 
studies, in fact, protest has mainly been considered as a ‘dependent variable’ and 
explained on the basis of political opportunities and organizational resources. 
In my conception of eventful democratization, I share the focus on the 
internal dynamics and transformative capacity of protest, looking however at a 
broader range of events than those included under the label of transformative 
protest. My assumption is that protest events have cognitive, affective, and 
relational impacts on the very actors that carry them out. Some forms of action 
or specific campaigns have a particularly high degree of eventfulness. Through 
these events, participants experiment with new tactics, send signals about the 
possibility of collective action, create feelings of solidarity, and consolidate 
organizational networks, while sometimes public outrage at repression 
develops. In fact, protest develops in eventful democratization through some 
specific cognitive, affective, and relational mechanisms. 
From the cognitive point of view, I stress mechanisms of growth in 
discursive generality and politicization as they develop in action. By growth in 
discursive generality I mean the cognitive expansion of protest claims, from 
more specific to more general concerns, as a way to bridge different 
constituencies. For instance, Foweraker and Landman (1997, 13) have observed 
the way in which claims develop in action, as in protest campaigns, which start 
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with specific claims and then move towards the call for a broader set of rights. 
In fact, rights have high symbolic power. Not only are they conquered through 
struggles, but the discourse on rights is effective in bonding collective demands. 
In the long history of social movements in Latin America, ‘participants learn 
their right lessons through the rigor of organization and the debates over 
strategy, so learning the language of rights’ in action (Foweraker and Landman 
1997, 33). There, liberalization processes have usually been prompted by 
mobilization on various rights: social movements have, indeed, been catalysts for 
change. Similarly, protests against the construction of big infrastructures often start 
from circumscribed concerns with the defence of the local environment, but then 
expand their discourses from Nimby (‘not in my back yard’) to Nope (‘not on 
planet earth’), while ecological claims are bridged with claims of justice (della 
Porta and Piazza 2008). 
Together with the growth in generality, there is a mechanism of 
politicization of the protest discourse, as the target of action is singled out in the 
government and the regime. While waves of protest might start with specific 
complaints against economic decline or diffuse corruption, protest gains 
momentum especially when a cognitive link is made between these grievances 
and government actions. In social movement studies, this attribution of political 
responsibility has often been noted as a characteristic of very different types of 
protest, from labour strikes to ethnic riots. 
Cognitive mechanisms are paralleled by emotional ones, such as moral 
shocks, but also feelings of collective empowerment. Scholars of social 
movements have compiled lists of emotions relevant for research, in recognition 
that ‘Social movements are awash in emotions. Anger, fear, envy, guilt, pity, 
shame, awe, passion, and other feelings play a part either in the formation of 
social movements, in their relations with their targets . . . and in the life of 
potential recruits and members’ (Kemper 2001, 58). Moral shocks are 
emotionally intense reactions of indignation against an action perceived as 
ethically unbearable, and thus alter ways of thinking (Gould 2004). Research on 
protest in authoritarian regimes has in fact stressed how episodes of brutal 
repression might increase rather than quell opposition, as they are perceived as 
outrageous by the population. They do facilitate mobilization in authoritarian 
regimes through the transformation of fear into rage. 
As negative emotions must be balanced by positive ones in order to fuel 
collective action, moral shocks must be accompanied by a feeling of collective 
empowerment, as a set of positive emotions that produce an enhanced sense of 
agency through identity building and solidarity ties. While the breakdown 
approach to social movements tended to consider emotions as negative and 
social movement activists as carriers of those negative emotions (for example, 
frustration, aggression, and so on), recent research has pointed out the relevance 
of additional emotions—negative, but also positive (such as joy, pride, pleasure, 
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and love)—for understanding social movement dynamics. Emotional liberation 
has been considered as important in explaining the development of protest, 
especially in risky forms of activism (Flam 2005). Reciprocal emotions 
(positive ones such as love and loyalty) have especially important effects on 
movement dynamics. 
Cognitive and affective mechanisms fuel relational ones, which take 
shape during eventful democratization. In various ways, coordination reduces 
the cost of participation as mobilization spreads: this emerges, in fact, in 
networked and aggregated forms. In his analysis of recent anti-austerity 
protests, Jeff Juris has distinguished these two forms of coordination, noting 
that ‘whereas the use of listservs and websites in the movements for global 
justice during the late 1990s and 2000s helped to generate and diffuse 
distributed networking logics, in the #Occupy movements social media have 
contributed to powerful logics of aggregation’ (2012, 260–61). While the logic 
of networking aims at connecting diverse collective actors, the logic of 
aggregation involves the assembling of diverse individuals in physical spaces. 
This distinction applies also to eventful democratization, where the two forms 
of coordination interact. As Osa (2003) noted, in Poland, waves of protest for 
democracy proceeded by bridging various groups, so that coordination was, at 
the same time, a precondition and an effect of mobilization. Eventually, it is the 
very definition of a collective actor which is at stake  
 
 
Eventful Democratization: A Summary 
 
Eventful democratization appears as sudden and unexpected, not only to 
observers or dictators, but also often to the very activists who mobilize against 
the authoritarian regimes. This difficulty in prediction is linked to agency and 
contingency: intense protest events are indeed under-determined moments as 
structural constraints are, if not overcome, at least weakened by the very 
capacity of mobilization to quickly transform relations. As Kurzman suggested 
in his analysis of the Iranian revolution, estimations of participation cannot be 
known in advance as ‘they shift drastically from moment to moment on the 
basis of amorphous rumours, heightened emotions, and conflicting senses of 
duty’ (Kurzman 2004, 170). 
Although under different external conditions, similar causal mechanisms 
were at work in the days of eventful democratization in the Czechoslovakia, 
GDR, Egypt and Tunisia. As mentioned, previous literature has stressed 
changes in individual preferences, or better, in the propensity to express them in 
public. In Kuran’s account, the East European regimes were more vulnerable 
than they seemed, as ‘Millions were prepared to stand up in defiance if ever 
they sensed that this was sufficiently safe. The people’s solidarity with their 
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leaders would then have been exposed as illusory, stripping the veneer of 
legitimacy from the communist monopoly on power’. The development of the 
events then also shifted the preferences of those who supported the regime in 
private, but with increasing doubts. In a similar analysis, Karl Opp and his 
collaborators suggested that political events themselves changed the structure of 
incentives due to increasing dissatisfaction and perceived political influence, 
plus social incentives. So, “an increase in protest may therefore have caused 
many individuals who hadn’t protested before to view action as a ‘must’ ” 
(Opp, Voss, and Gern 1995, 195). 
Following the social movement literature, I have instead looked at causal 
mechanisms at the collective level. From the point of view of relational 
mechanisms, coordination (more structured but also less so) occurred in action, 
linked to the daily needs of the mobilization itself. In action, cognitive 
mechanisms developed also: there was, here as well, a growth in generality of 
the claims and a politicization of the discourse. Emotional mechanisms were 
also at work, intensifying positive ties of solidarity among protestors, and 
transforming fear into rage. 
Indeed, these reflections point at the role of agency as the necessary 
complement of structures. If protests in eventful temporality change the 
structure of relations, this does not mean that contextual characteristics are not 
important in influencing the timing and fate of the mobilization for democracy. 
As Craig Calhoun observed in his analysis of the 1989 protests in China, 
‘Underlying conditions make a movement possible, but they do not make the 
movement happen . . . movements are products of human action . . . the action 
in social movements consists also of choices made in the heat of struggle, 
decisions made on the run’ (1994, 19). In 1989, as during the Arab Spring, what 
has been called a relational process of subversion developed, made up of 
various sequences of multi-sector mobilization and political fluidity (Bennani-
Chraibi and Fillieule 2012).  
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